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Abstract
This paper introduces and describes unobserved heterogeneity in earnings quintiles transition
matrices in the US. Unobserved heterogeneity is found to play a crucial role in earnings mobility.
Each individual is attracted, given his characteristics, towards a speciﬁc zone of the distribution.
At the stationnary equilibrium, the earnings quintiles distribution is thus segmented. Interest-
ingly, while the level of earnings mobility has remained quite stable since 1970, the width of these
zones has decreased, such that this segmentation was more pronounced in the 80’s and the 90’s
than in the 70’s, especially in the middle of the quintiles distribution.
Résumé
Ce papier introduit de l’hétérogénéité inobservée dans les matrices de transition entre quintiles de
salaires. Sa description permet d’étudier la structure de la mobilité des revenus aux Etats-Unis.
L’hétérogénéité inobservée joue un rôle essentiel dans la mobilité des revenus et sa caractéristique
est que chaque individu est attiré, en fonction de ses caractéristiques, vers une zone spéciﬁque
de la distribution des quintiles. A l’équilibre stationnaire, cette distribution est donc segmentée.
De plus, alors que le niveau de la mobilité des revenus est resté à peu près stable depuis 1970,
la largeur de ces zones a diminué, de sorte que cette segmentation est plus prononcée depuis les
années 80, surtout dans le milieu de la distribution.
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applies.1 Introduction
Earnings mobility measures the way people move on the income ladder. There are traditionnally
two reasons to study such an outcome. First, it is of interest to know in a given economy if it is
more or less diﬃcult to move up the economic ladder. In the US, this refers to the very popular
idea of the “American dream”. Second it is now well known that earnings mobility decreases
long term income inequality, which means that a stronger mobility can oﬀset the eﬀects of an
increase in cross section inequality1. In other words, an increase in earnings inequality (the rich
become richer with respect to the poor) is less a concern if mobility increases (that is if the
transition poor/rich becomes easier). The case of the United States has been widely studied2
and the summary of this literature (Gottschalk, 1997) is that there is a substantial degree of
mobility, but that when people move they don’t move far and that this degree of mobility has
not increased in the 80’s , which means that earnings mobility has not oﬀset the eﬀects of the
dramatic increase of earnings inequality in the 80’s.
However, there is a third reason that justiﬁes being interested in the study of earnings mo-
bility, namely the consequences of the structure of earnings mobility on the segmentation of the
population. To make this idea clear, let’s take a very simple example. Suppose that we are
interested in the way workers move, year on year, with respect to the median of the earnings
distribution. Suppose that the unconditionnal transition matrix is such that individuals initially
below the median have a probability of 0.6 to stay below it (and hence 0.4 to move up) and that
individuals initially above the median have a probability of 0.6 to stay above (and hence 0.4 to
move down). Suppose now that there is some heterogeneity in the mobility process such that
two types of workers exist, each one (50% of the population) being associated with a speciﬁc
transition matrix, the weighted sum of the conditionnal transition matrices equalling the uncon-
ditionnal one. Suppose that type 1 workers have a probability of 1 to stay below and 0.8 to
1 See Atkinson et al. (1992) for an introduction to earnings mobility.
2 See for example Buchinsky and Hunt (1999), Gottschalk and Moﬃt (1998), Burkhauser et al. (1997) and
Kopczuk et al. (2007).
1move down when they are initially above: when they are below, they don’t move and when they
are above, most of them move down. In some sense type 1 workers are strongly associated with
the bottom of the distribution, they are attracted towards it and it is clear that if the process
runs indeﬁnitely, all type 1 workers will be below the median. Now suppose, symmetrically, that
type 2 workers have a probability of 1 to stay above and 0.8 to move up when they are initially
below: they are attracted towards the top of the distribution and are all above at the stationnary
equilibrium. In this very stylised example, it is clear that the introduction of heterogeneity in
the mobility process make the population totally segmented at the stationnary equilibrium: type
one workers are below the median and type 2 workers are above.
The goal of this paper is to follow this idea: is there some heterogeneity in earnings mobility?
And if the answer is positive, what are its consequences on the segmentation of the population?
As far as I know this paper is the ﬁrst to raise this question in these terms, and hence there
is no speciﬁc related literature. However, some papers on earnings mobility can provide some
preliminary answers. For the United States, the issue of obseved heterogeneity has been tackled
by Gittleman and Joyce (1995), Schiller (1994) and more recently by Kopczuk et al. (2007).
Gittleman and Joyce found that the young, the less educated and blacks are more mobile than
those who are older, more educated or white. Schiller (1994) showed that in the 80’s young
women had more downward mobility and less upward mobility than young men. Kopczuk et al.
(2007) conﬁrmed the result that women experience less upward mobility than men. Thus, we
know today that the structure of earnings mobility is not the same across demographic groups. In
Weber (2002), the author studies whether earnings mobility exhibits state dependence, and shows
that if unobserved heterogeneity is not taken into account state dependence is over estimated.
This paper is the ﬁrst to show the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the mobility process.
However, it is not described and hence the question of segmentation can not be addressed.
In this paper, to introduce heterogeneity in quintiles transition matricies, earnings quintiles
dynamics is, as in Weber (2002), directly modelled with a dynamic multinomial logit with un-
observed heterogeneity. On the one hand, state dependence parameters (that is coeﬃcients
2associated to lagged dependent variables), being common to all individuals, can be interpreted
as labor market ﬂexibility. On the other hand, unobserved heterogeneity, which is individual
speciﬁc, reﬂects time-constant, observable (like sex, race and education) and unobservable indi-
vidual characteristics. The model is estimated in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage lag coeﬃcients
are estimated by conditionnal maximum likelihood (Magnac, 2000), a method that allows the
identiﬁcation to be robust to any speciﬁcation of the unobserved heterogeneity. In a second
stage, and following Heckman and Singer (1984), the support of the unobserved heterogeneity is
supposed to be discrete, that is the population is supposed to be composed of types. The initial
conditions problem (Heckman, 1981b) is solved with the method proposed by Wooldridge (2005)
and the likelihood is maximized via a standard EM algorithm.
The four main results are the following. First, labor market ﬂexibility appears to take the
form of a downward rigidity. Second, the population is found to be composed of 5 types in the 70’s
and 6 in the 80’s and the 90’s, which means that unobserved heterogeneity plays a major role in
earnings mobility: this paper shows that the mobility process is individual speciﬁc and that it is
not suﬃcient to compute unconditionnal transition matrices to study earnings mobility. Third,
the description of the conditionnal transition matrices shows that the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity leads to a segmentation of the quintiles distribution: each individual is strongly
associated with a speciﬁc zone of the distribution and is attracted towards it, in such a way that
at the stationnary equilibrium individuals spend most of their time in that speciﬁc zone. The
last result is that, interestingly, while the level of earnings mobility has remained quite stable
for three decades, its structure has evolved in the middle of the distribution: the speciﬁc zones
in which individuals move were larger in the 70’s, which means that the segmentation was more
pronounced in the 80’s and the 90’s than in the 70’s.
The paper is organized as follows. The data is described in section 2, the econometric frame-
work is detailed in section 3, the results are presented in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
32 Data description
2.1 The dataset
I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a representative panel of the US
population which was started in 1968 and is still carried out today. The unit of obsevation is the
household, the interviews were annual until 1997 and have been bisannual since then. There were
4800 households in 1968 and 7000 in 2001, totaling 65000 individuals observed in 2001. In 1968,
the PSID was composed of two separate samples, the ﬁrst one, the SRC sample, is representative
of the US population, whereas the second, the SEO sample, speciﬁcally deals with low income
households. Thus, low incomes are over-represented in the whole sample and, therefore, I restrict
the study to the SRC sample, without using weights, similarly to Moﬃt and Gottschalk (2002).
To introduce unobserved heterogeneity, panel data are needed. On the one hand, to limit
attrition, the step of mobility must be as short as possible; on the other hand the identiﬁcation
of unobserved heterogeneity requires movements in the quintiles distribution and thus a step as
large as possible3. A step of two years is a good compromise and is adopted in this study. As a
consequence, in this paper, earnings mobility must be understood as a short term mobility. In
order to minimize measurement error, I use total annual labor income rather than the wage rate
because the number of hours worked is poorly reported in the PSID (see for example Bound and
al. (1994) for a validation study of the PSID). For the same reason, quintiles are preferred to
deciles or ventiles.
The period is splitted into the 70’s (1970, 1972, 1974, 1976 and 1978), the 80’s (1980, 1982,
1984, 1986 and 1988) and the 90’s (1990, 1992, 1994, 1996 and 1998). For each decade I retain in-
dividuals who have non-missing observations at each date of the decade. The econometric frame-
work involves data intensive semi-parametric techniques (conditionnal maximum likelihood). To
3 It is well known in the earnings mobility literature that earnings mobility is an increasing function of its
step. It simply reﬂects that when mobility is measured with a larger step, workers have more time to move and
earnings mobility increases.
4maximize sample size, I only restrict the sample to 25-60 year-olds at each date of the decade
in order to avoid student workers. Moreover this method doesn’t allow time-varying variables,
that’s why the quintiles are not computed directly on the earnings but with the residuals of the
regression of the earnings on a constant, age (classiﬁed by categories) and age crossed with sex,
race and education (College or Not). In order to take into account non-employment, I follow
Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) and I create a quintile zero that includes individuals out of the labor
market, unemployed or working part-time (at most 1200 hours per year in the 70’s, 1300 in
the 80’s and 1400 in the 90’s4). Lastly, in order to eliminate outliers, I delete from the decade
individuals who achieve at least one time in the decade the transition 1-4, 1-5, 2-5, 5-2, 5-1 or
4-15. The ﬁnal sample is composed of 1921 ∗ 5 individual-year in the 70’s, 2581 ∗ 5 in the 80’s
and 3029 ∗ 5 in the 90’s6. Women represent each decade around 55% of the sample (55.1 in the
70’s, 54.2 in the 80’s and 54.9 in the 90’s), Non-white people around 10% (10.0, 9.0 and 8.7), and
the share of college graduates is increasing (38.2, 53.0 and 59.1), reﬂecting the general increase
in the education level during the period.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
To describe relative earnings mobility one of the most appropriate tool is the transition matrix
between earnings quintiles. Table 1 presents these transition matrices for the 70’s, the 80’s and
90’s. The results are very classical. First, for all periods the most probable transition is the
stability. There is more mobility in the middle of the distribution than at the extremes; the vast
majority of movements are achieved in an adjacent quintile; upward mobility is slightly greater
than downward mobility at the bottom of the distribution and downward mobility is greater
than upward mobility at the top. Lastly, earnings mobility has remained fairly stable between
4 These thresholds have been chosen such that 25% of the workers work less than this value. As the number
of hours worked increased between 1970 and 2000, these thresholds have also increased.
5The frequence of these transitions is not high enough to be studied within the data intensive econometric
framework of this paper.
6 Sample sizes increase because the PSID follows the children of the original sample individuals
5Table 1: Two-Year Quintile Transition matrices, 1970-1998
70’s
Origin Destination Quintile Direction
Quintile 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum Down Stable Up Sum
0 84.3 6.8 3.9 2.0 1.6 1.4 100.0 0.0 84.3 15.7 100.0
1 16.3 56.0 20.5 7.2 0.0 0.0 100.0 16.3 56.0 27.7 100.0
2 8.4 17.9 43.4 23.6 6.7 0.0 100.0 26.3 43.4 30.3 100.0
3 6.8 5.3 19.4 40.4 22.3 5.8 100.0 31.5 40.4 28.1 100.0
4 5.1 0.0 5.4 22.5 44.6 22.4 100.0 33.0 44.6 22.4 100.0
5 5.6 0.0 0.0 4.9 21.9 67.6 100.0 32.4 67.6 0.0 100.0
80’s
Origin Destination Quintile Direction
Quintile 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum Down Stable Up Sum
0 75.0 11.4 6.1 3.7 2.5 1.3 100.0 0.0 75.0 25.0 100.0
1 19.5 53.7 20.6 6.2 0.0 0.0 100.0 19.5 53.7 26.8 100.0
2 11.3 15.4 43.7 22.4 7.2 0.0 100.0 26.7 43.7 29.6 100.0
3 8.9 4.3 16.3 45.2 20.7 4.6 100.0 29.5 45.2 25.3 100.0
4 7.9 0.0 5.4 17.4 46.8 22.5 100.0 30.7 46.8 22.5 100.0
5 4.3 0.0 0.0 5.0 20.3 70.4 100.0 29.6 70.4 0.0 100.0
90’s
Origin Destination Quintile Direction
Quintile 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum Down Stable Up Sum
0 73.7 11.7 5.6 3.8 2.9 2.3 100.0 0.0 73.7 26.3 100.0
1 21.7 54.9 18.6 4.8 0.0 0.0 100.0 21.7 54.9 23.4 100.0
2 10.5 16.0 47.4 21.2 4.9 0.0 100.0 26.5 47.4 26.1 100.0
3 9.6 3.7 17.7 45.3 19.1 4.6 100.0 31.0 45.3 23.7 100.0
4 8.5 0.0 4.3 17.2 52.6 17.4 100.0 30.0 52.6 17.4 100.0
5 8.3 0.0 0.0 4.4 16.1 71.2 100.0 28.8 71.2 0.0 100.0
Notes: PSID, 25-60 years old, annual earnings. 1921∗5 observations in the 70’s, 2581∗5 in the 80’s
and 3029∗5 in the 90’s. Quintile 0 takes into account individuals out of the labor market, unemployed
or who work part-time (at most 1200 hours per year in the 70’s, 1300 in the 80’s and 1400 in the 90’s).
6the 70’s and the 80’s and has slightly decreased in the 90’s, which implies that earnings mobility
has not oﬀset the dramatic increase of earnings inequality on the period.
3 Econometric framework
3.1 Theoritical background
Various classical labor market theories are useful to understand earnings mobility. These models
are surveyed in Shiller (1977), Agell and Bennmarker (2007) and Cardoso (2006) and are here
brieﬂy summarized.
Earnings stability can be explained by several factors. The ﬁrst factors are individual speciﬁc.
The population in each quintile at every period is selected on the basis of their time constant
characterisitics, and have thus some propensity to stay in the same quintile in the next period.
These characteristics can be linked to the initial investments in general human capital or to
some characteristics, like sex and race, that can be sources of discrimination. Time varying
characteristics can also generate stability: if those who have the best diplomas accumulate more
human capital via experience, then the initial rankings are reinforced. The second factors are
common to every individual. Eﬃciency wages models show that imperfect information on the
labor market can lead to downward wage rigidity: ﬁrms cannot decrease wages, even if they are
hit by a negative demand shock, because workers could decrease their eﬀort or quit. Second
institutionnal factors like collective bargaining, employment protection or the existence of a
national minimum wage can be the source of earnings immobility.
On the other hand, two factors can explain earnings mobility. The ﬁrst is productivity shocks,
the second is linked to on the job human capital investments: if on the job training implies a
sacriﬁce of present earnings, one might expect movements in relative earnings ranks as individuals
experience the burdens and the payoﬀs of their varying investment decisions.
73.2 The model
To introduce unobserved heterogeneity in earnings mobility, I model quintiles dynamics with a
dynamic multinomial logit with unobserved heterogeneity7. More precisely, note yit (yit = 0...5)
the quintile of individual i (i = 1...N) at date t (t = 1...T). I suppose that












δjk1{yit−1=j} + αik + ǫikt (1)
As in every discrete choice model, a reference state must be deﬁned and some parameters set to
zero. I choose the non full time employment (quintile 0) and I suppose that ∀j = 0...5, δj0 = 0,
∀i = 1...N, αi0 = 0 and ∀k = 0...5 δ0k = 0. Because I delete from the sample all the individuals
who achieve an extreme transition (1-4, 1-5, 2-5, 5-2, 5-1 or 4-1), these transitions must be
impossible in the model and that is why I suppose that δ14 = δ15 = δ25 = δ41 = δ51 = δ52 = −∞.
I suppose that the ǫ′s are type I extreme value distributed, and that they are independent
accross alternatives, individuals and time, and independent of the α’s. I note ∀i = 1...N,
αi = (αi0,...,αi5)′. Consequently the probability of an individual i being in state k in period t
(t = 2...T) conditionnal on being in state j in period t − 1 is given by






which implies that the transition matrix is heterogenous between individuals. Moreover, the law
of yi1 is supposed to be an unspeciﬁed function of αi, which means that an initial conditions
problem must be taken into account.
7 This speciﬁcation is preferred to the one that consists in modelling the wages (see Meghir and Pistaferri
(2004) and Bonhomme and Robin (2007) for recent examples in this area) and then deriving the quintiles because
it is more ﬂexible to model directly the quintiles.
8From a statistical point of view, this model can be considered as a “non-linear equivalent” of
the ARMA used in the earnings dynamics literature (see for example Burkhauser et al. (1997)):
the right hand side of (1) is composed of the lag of the dependent variable (the AR component),
a time-constant individual-speciﬁc eﬀect and a transitory shock8. From an economic point of
view, the eﬀect of the lag (ie the state dependence9), being common to each individual, can be
interpreted as the degree of the ﬂexibility of the labor market. Time-constant individual-speciﬁc
parameters reﬂect variables like initial education level, sex, race, motivation, etc10. Lastly the
transitory component reﬂects iid productivity shocks.
The interpretation of the parameters is facilitated by writing
P(yit = k /yit−1 = j , αi)
P(yit = l/yit−1 = j , αi)
= exp((δjk − δjl) + (αik − αil)) (3)
With (3) we can see that the higher (αik − αil), the higher the odds of being in state k with
respect to state l, conditionnal on any lagged state j. Now note that if αik = αil then
P(yit = k/yit−1 = j , αi)
P(yit = l/yit−1 = j , αi)
= exp(δjk − δjl) (4)
which means that δjk−δjl is a direct measure of the log odds ratios for observations who have the
same “individual propensities” to be in states k and l. It is thus a measure of state dependence
and it provides a way to test its presence.
8 However, papers like Burkhauser et al. ﬁnd in earnings level dynamics a MA(1) component as well and this
AR(1) asumption is thus somewhat restrictive. The study of this potential MA component in earnings quintile
dynamics is left for future research.
9 See Heckman (1981a) for an introduction to state dependence.
10 This interpretation explains why the individual parameters are state-speciﬁc and not the same for all the
quintiles: if the eﬀect of education is to increase the probability to be in the top quintile and to decreases the
probability to be in the quintile 1, then it cannot enter in the same way in every state equation.
93.3 Estimation
To estimate the model, a two steps procedure is implemented. In the ﬁrst step the state depen-
dence parameters (the δ’s) are estimated with a semi-parametric technique and these estimates
are used in a second step to estimate the unobserved heterogeneity (the α’s).
In the ﬁrst step, the conditionnal maximum likelihood method developped by Magnac (2000)
is applied. The idea is to condition the likelihood by suﬃcient statistics such that the conditionnal
likelihood does not depend anymore on the individual eﬀects. This method is very attractive
because it solves directly the initial conditions problem (Heckman, 1981b) and it allows to make
no asumption on the law of unobserved heterogeneity11. However with this technique it is not
possible to take into account time-varying covariates, which is potentially a problem for time
trend and experience. 12. To solve this problem, the eﬀects of time and experience are eliminated
from the earnings: the quintiles are not computed directly on the earnings but with the residuals
of the regression of the log-earnings on a constant, age (by class) and age crossed with sex, race
and education (College or Not)13.
Setting Yik the number of times individual i has been in quintile k between periods 2 and
T − 1, Magnac (2000) shows in his Appendix B that























11These features justify the use of a two steps procedure rather than a one step, which would require, to estimate
the δ’s, to specify the law of the unobserved heterogeneity and to approximate the correlation between the latter
and the initial conditions.
12To do so the extended method of Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) could have been used, but the sample size
of the PSID is too small for that and it explains why the model has no time varying covariates.
13These regressions are performed year by year.
10where Bi = {b = (yi2,...,yiT−1)/∀k > 0,
T−1 X
t=2
1{yit−1=j} = Yik} is the set of all possible histories
that are compatible with the number of visits to each state from 2 to T − 1. This conditionnal
likelihood doesn’t depend anymore on αi, which means intuitively that individuals who have the
same number of visits to each state, but not at the same time, have the same level of unobserved
heterogeneity. This is essentially the asumption used to identify the δ’s.
To estimate the law of unobserved heterogeneity, ie the law of αi, asumptions must be done
and thus random eﬀects techniques must be applied. To minimize the impact of distributional
assumptions I follow Heckman and Singer (1984) and I choose a discrete law, the number of sup-
port points (or number of types) being determined with an increasing iterative process stopped
when the model has a good ﬁt. To solve the initial conditions problem I adopt the solution
proposed by Wooldridge (2005): I maximise the likelihood conditionnal on the initial conditions
and I let the law of αi depend on it. More precisely, I maximize
P
￿
















where l denotes one of the L types and ˆ δ represents ﬁrst stage estimates. It must be noted that
this likelihood is conditionnal on yi1 and that the term P(αi = αl
i/yi1) shows that the law of
αi depends on yi1. The parameters to be determined are ∀ l = 1...L and ∀ k = 0...5, αl
i and
P(αi = αl
i/yi1 = k) (that I note πlk). This likelihood is maximized via a standard EM algorithm,
by iterating the two following steps.
• E-Step
For initial values from the step r-1 (αl
i)(r−1) and π
(r−1)
lk , for each type l = 1...L and each individual




























Update the law of unobserved heterogeneity by averaging the posterior probabilities obtained in



















wil lnP(yit/yit−1,αi = a,yi1)
The latter expression is the likelihood of a multinomial logit weighted by the E-step posteriors
and is thus easily maximized.
The estimation of the model allows me to compute the individual-speciﬁc quintiles transi-
tion matrix associated with each estimated type of individual using (2). To characterize each
transition matrix it is of interest to determine what happens if the process runs indeﬁnitely. To
do so I compute, for each matrix, the stationnary equilibrium distributions, that is the quintiles
distributions Q such that Q = M′Q, where M is the speciﬁc transition matrix. Hence, for each
transition matrix, the stationnary equilibrium distribution is the eigenvector of the eigenvalue
one associated to the transpose of the transition matrix. These distributions show the zone in
which individuals move.
124 Results
4.1 Number of types and ﬁt of the model
The number of support points of the unobserved heterogeneity is chosen for every decade in order
to maximize the ﬁt to real transition matrices (Table 1). I compare observed transition matrices
with simulated ones that I compute using the estimated parameters and (2). The process is
iterative in the sens that I start by estimating the model with two types, and if I observe that
the ﬁt is not good, I try with three. I stop when the ﬁt is maximum.
For the 70’s, the ﬁt with 5 types is better than with 4 and is the same than the one of the
model with 6 types. After six types, the algorithm does not converge. To choose between 5 and
6 types (models A and B), I compute the stationnary equilibrium distributions for each type
and I observe that both models have 4 types in common while one type of the model A (let’s
call it type 0) is splitted in two types in the model B (types 00 and 01). In the model A the
type 0 is composed of individuals who stay most of the time in the quintile zero and sometimes
in the quintile one. In the model B the type 00 is composed of individuals who stay always in
the quintile zero, and type 01 of individuals who spend most of their time in quintile zero and
sometimes in quintile one. So, types 00 and 01 are a decomposition of the type 0, and therefore
models A and B give essentially the same interpretation. As the focus of the paper is primarily
the structure of the mobility of individuals who work full time, I don’t regard the decomposition
of the type associated with the quintile zero as important and I retain the model A. For the 80’s,
the ﬁts are good both with 5 and 6 types. The problem of the model with 5 types is that one type
is composed of individuals who spend their time either in quintile one or in quintile ﬁve. This
type has no economic interpretation and thus the model with six types is preferred. For the 90’s
the model with 6 types has the best ﬁt and is thus adopted. The simulated transition matrices
are presented in Table 2. They must be compared to the observed ones between brackets. It is
clear that the ﬁts of the three models are very good.
13Table 2: Fit of the Estimated Models
Origin Destination Quintile, 70’s Destination Quintile, 80’s Destination Quintile, 90’s
Quintile 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 85.4 6.4 3.7 2.0 1.6 0.9 78.3 9.9 5.2 3.5 1.9 1.1 74.7 11.6 5.1 3.6 2.8 2.2
(84.3) (6.8) (3.9) (2.0) (1.6) (1.4) (75.0) (11.4) (6.1) (3.7) (2.5) (1.3) (73.7) (11.7) (5.6) (3.8) (2.9) (2.3)
1 17.8 55.3 20.1 6.7 0.0 0.0 20.8 54.7 19.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 20.2 56.7 18.7 4.4 0.0 0.0
(16.3) (56.0) (20.5) (7.2) (0.0) (0.0) (19.5) (53.7) (20.6) (6.2) (0.0) (0.0) (21.7) (54.9) (18.6) (4.8) (0.0) (0.0)
2 8.4 18.1 42.4 24.2 7.0 0.0 11.4 16.4 44.8 21.2 6.3 0.0 10.3 16.6 48.1 20.5 4.5 0.0
(8.4) (17.9) (43.4) (23.6) (6.7) (0.0) (11.3) (15.4) (43.7) (22.4) (7.2) (0.0) (10.5) (16.0) (47.4) (21.2) (4.9) (0.0)
3 6.8 5.7 22.1 38.9 20.6 6.0 9.1 4.2 16.6 47.9 18.3 3.8 10.4 3.8 18.1 44.0 19.1 4.6
(6.8) (5.3) (19.4) (40.4) (22.3) (5.8) (8.9) (4.3) (16.3) (45.2) (20.7) (4.6) (9.6) (3.7) (17.7) (45.3) (19.1) (4.6)
4 5.1 0.0 5.7 23.2 43.1 22.9 6.8 0.0 5.7 16.5 49.3 21.7 8.0 0.0 4.8 16.3 52.6 18.3
(5.1) (0.0) (5.4) (22.5) (44.6) (22.4) (7.9) (0.0) (5.4) (17.4) (46.8) (22.5) (8.5) (0.0) (4.3) (17.2) (52.6) (17.4)
5 4.5 0.0 0.0 4.4 22.2 68.9 3.6 0.0 0.0 4.7 20.5 71.2 8.5 0.0 0.0 4.5 16.2 70.8
(5.6) (0.0) (0.0) (4.9) (21.9) (67.6) (4.3) (0.0) (0.0) (5.0) (20.3) (70.4) (8.3) (0.0) (0.0) (4.4) (16.1) (71.2)




The estimates of state dependence parameters (the δ’s) are presented in Table 3. To interpret
the results, the relevant measure is the diﬀerence between the δ’s and not the δ’s themselves. For
example, if δ21 < δ22, an individual initially in the quintile 2 and who has αi1 = αi2
14 has a greater
probability to stay than to move down in quintile one. Thus the comparison between the δ’s
can be interpreted as a comparison of probabilities for people who have the same “characteristic-
related” propensities. Moreover, these coeﬃcients being common to all individuals, they can
be interpreted as a measure of labor market ﬂexibility. The ﬁrst result of Table 3 is that all
coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero: labor market ﬂexibility makes the
transition towards quintile zero the less probable one. Now if I concentrate on the quintiles one
to ﬁve it is interesting to test the equality of the parameters on each row. These (Wald) tests
are presented in Table 4. The ﬁrst remark is that almost all the results are similar for the three
decades. The hypothesis that parameters from a same row are equal is rejected for all the rows,
which means that there is some state dependence in earnings mobility. This result is consistent
with Weber (2002). To see if the state dependence comes from upward or downward mobility I
perform tests on some parts of each row. On each row, the hypothesis that the parameter δjj is
equal to the parameters δjk, k > j, can not be rejected. On the contrary, the hypothesis that the
parameter δjj is equal to the parameters δjk, k < j is strongly rejected. In other words, the state
dependence favors upward mobility as much as the stability, but more than downward mobility.
In some sense, the state dependence prevents from moving down. Therefore, as far as state
dependence is a measure of labor market ﬂexibility, the latter seems to behave like a downward
rigidity. This result refers to the literature on wage rigidity, and in particular on downward
wage rigidity, in which it is now well known that wages are rigid, and especially downward (see
for example Agell and Benmarker for a recent study). This paper shows that it is also true for
earnings quintiles.
14 That is someone who has the same “characteristic-related” propensities to be in the quintiles 1 and 2.
15Table 3: State Dependence Parameters
Origin Destination Quintile, 70’s Destination Quintile, 80’s Destination Quintile, 90’s
Quintile 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
1 0 1.6 1.9 2.0 −∞ −∞ 0 1.5 1.3 1.2 −∞ −∞ 0 1.6 1.5 1.0 −∞ −∞
− (0.24) (0.26) (0.35) − − − (0.17) (0.19) (0.25) − − − (0.16) (0.18) (0.24) − −
2 0 1.5 2.7 2.9 2.6 −∞ 0 0.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 −∞ 0 1.3 2.2 2.2 1.7 −∞
− (0.29) (0.32) (0.33) (0.39) − − (0.20) (0.21) (0.22) (0.27) − − (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.27) −
3 0 1.1 2.4 3.4 3.1 3.0 0 0.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 0 0.4 1.6 2.4 2.5 2.5
− (0.35) (0.33) (0.39) (0.39) (0.48) − (0.26) (0.23) (0.26) (0.27) (0.37) − (0.24) (0.21) (0.24) (0.24) (0.32)
4 0 −∞ 2.3 3.5 3.7 4.0 0 −∞ 1.4 2.1 3.5 3.9 0 −∞ 1.3 2.0 3.0 2.9
− − (0.41) (0.40) (0.45) (0.50) − − (0.27) (0.27) (0.33) (0.39) − − (0.26) (0.24) (0.26) (0.29)
5 0 −∞ −∞ 2.7 3.7 4.6 0 −∞ −∞ 2.2 3.8 4.8 0 −∞ −∞ 1.5 2.1 2.9
− − − (0.51) (0.51) (0.60) − − − (0.37) (0.38) (0.46) − − − (0.29) (0.28) (0.31)
Notes: PSID, 25-60 years old, annual earnings. For each decade, the parameter crossing the origin quintile j and the destination quintile k is the estimate
of δjk. Standard errors between brackets.
1
6Table 4: Wald Tests of the Presence of State Dependence
70’s 80’s 90’s
H0 DF Wald P-value Wald P-value Wald P-value
Statistics Statistics Statistics
δ11 = δ12 = δ13 2 1.86 0.39431 1.80 0.40748 6.46 0.03959
δ11 = δ12 1 1.45 0.22895 0.88 0.34882 0.33 0.56336
δ21 = δ22 = δ23 = δ24 3 24.70 0.00002 26.00 0.00001 28.13 0.00000
δ22 = δ23 = δ24 2 1.14 0.56436 0.03 0.98738 3.73 0.15469
δ22 = δ23 1 0.71 0.40028 0.02 0.90179 0.02 0.87511
δ22 = δ21 1 18.73 0.00002 22.11 0.00000 23.45 0.00000
δ31 = δ32 = δ33 = δ34 = δ35 4 41.50 0.00000 56.53 0.00000 71.89 0.00000
δ33 = δ34 = δ35 2 1.61 0.44656 0.04 0.98021 0.01 0.99577
δ33 = δ34 1 1.28 0.25877 0.01 0.91994 0.01 0.92715
δ31 = δ32 = δ33 2 40.09 0.00000 48.18 0.00000 62.26 0.00000
δ32 = δ33 1 11.31 0.00077 16.63 0.00005 15.42 0.00009
δ42 = δ43 = δ44 = δ45 3 18.08 0.00042 61.80 0.00000 42.70 0.00000
δ44 = δ45 1 0.38 0.53636 1.26 0.26079 0.22 0.63914
δ42 = δ43 = δ44 2 16.26 0.00029 51.51 0.00000 40.11 0.00000
δ43 = δ44 1 0.55 0.45945 28.04 0.00000 18.06 0.00002
δ53 = δ54 = δ55 2 15.23 0.00049 41.74 0.00000 18.61 0.00009
δ54 = δ55 1 4.77 0.02902 9.84 0.00171 8.98 0.00274
Notes: PSID, 25-60 years old, annual earnings.
174.3 Unobserved heterogeneity
With the estimates of the δ’s and the α’s and the expression (2) of the transition probabilities
deduced from the model, I compute a speciﬁc quintile transition matrix for each type of individ-
uals (ie for each discrete value of α). These matrices are presented for the 70’s, the 80’s and the
90’s in the Tables 6, 7 and 8 in the appendix. Let’s look for example at the speciﬁc matrix in the
bottom left of Table 8. This type represents 12.7% of the population. When these individuals
are initially in quintile 3, the most probable destination quintile is the quintile 3 (61.1%). When
they are initially in quintile 2, the most probable transition is also to move up in the quintile
3 (53.5%), and in fact for all the origin quintiles (but the quintile zero, which is a particular
quintile), the quintile 3 is the most probable destination. Individuals of this type can be charac-
terized by the fact that they are “attracted” towards the quintile 3, whichever quintile they start
in. That is why this type can be labelled type 3. Actually this phenomenon is present for all the
types of Table 8. For example, in the top right matrix, it is clear that the column corresponding
to the destination quintile 2 is the mode of each conditionnal distribution15, which means that
this speciﬁc transition matrix attracts towards the quintile 2 and can be labelled type 2. These
results mean that in the 90’s, each individual, given his time-constant characteristics, is attracted
towards a speciﬁc quintile. This is also true in the 80’s (see Table 7 in the appendix), but the
situation is diﬀerent in the 70’s. Let’s look for example at the bottom right transition matrix in
Table 6. Individuals of this type are clearly “attracted” towards the quintile 5 and this type is
thus called type 5. This type is similar to those of the 80’s and the 90’s. This is also the cases of
the so-called types 0 and 1. But if we look for example at the top right matrix, we see that when
the individuals come from the bottom of the distribution (quintiles 1, 2 and to some extent 3)
they take the direction of quintile 2, whereas when they are initially in the quintiles 4 or 5 they
arrive in the quintile 316. It is still true that individuals are “attracted” towards a zone of the
15 Note that it is not true for the origin quintile 5. It stems from the fact that, by hypothesis, the transition
5-2 is not allowed (δ52 = −∞), and thus the probability of the transition 5-2 equals zero. The most probable
destination quintile is then the adjacent quintile 3.
16 This type is thus called type 2-3
18distribution, but that zone does’nt seem to be restricted to a speciﬁc quintile. This phenomenon
is also true for the so-called type 3-4.
To see more precisely the zones that individuals are attracted to, in other words the zones
to which individuals, at the stationnary equilibrium, move most of the time, it is useful to
compute, for each type-speciﬁc matrix, the quintiles stationnary equilibrium distributions17.
These distributions are presented in Table 5. For example, for the 90’s, at the stationnary
equilibrium, we see that 8.4% of the type 2 individuals are in the quintile 0, 10.9%, 55.6%,
22.4%, 2.7% and 0.0% in the quintiles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively. This means that a majority
of type 2 individuals are each year, at the stationnary equilibrium, in the quintile 2, or in other
words that type 2 individuals spend most of their time, at the stationnary equilibrium, in quintile
2. Table 5 shows that this result is true for all types, for the 80’s and the 90’s. This conﬁrms the
idea that the nature of the heterogeneity is to attract individuals towards a speciﬁc quintile in the
80’s and the 90’s. Thus the presence of heterogeneity in the earnings mobility process leads to a
segmentation of the population. The meaning of that segmentation, in the 80’s and the 90’s, is
that each individual spends most of the time in the same quintile, revolving around from time to
time. For the 70’s, type 2-3 individuals spend at the stationnary equilibrium respectively 42.1%
and 35.1% of their time in the quintiles 2 and 3, and type 3-4 individuals 29.4% and 49.3% in the
quintiles 3 and 4. These two types of individuals spend most of their time in two quintiles. The
diﬀerence between the 70’s and the following decades is that, in the middle of the distribution
in the 70’s, the zones are not centered around a speciﬁc quintile but are rather composed of two
quintiles that are both regularly visited. Thus in the middle of the distribution, the zones in
which individuals move are larger and have a greater intersection in the 70’s, which means that
the segmentation was less pronounced at that time.
As a robustness check I change the deﬁnition of the quintile zero, by including only zero
wages (out of the labor market or unemployed all the year), part-time workers being taken into
17 See section 3.3.
19Table 5: Speciﬁc Quintiles Stationnary Distributions
70’s
Quintile
Type 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum
0 83.7 5.0 4.1 3.7 2.5 1.0 100.0
1 14.5 61.9 18.8 2.4 0.0 2.4 100.0
2 − 3 6.3 8.2 42.1 35.1 6.4 1.9 100.0
3 − 4 5.1 3.9 4.6 29.4 49.3 7.7 100.0
5 10.4 0.0 0.3 4.1 20.2 65.0 100.0
80’s
Quintile
Type 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum
0 89.1 6.9 2.1 0.9 0.8 0.3 100.0
1 22.2 63.7 11.5 2.2 0.4 0.0 100.0
2 2.9 24.3 61.9 9.3 1.5 0.2 100.0
3 11.9 4.3 18.7 48.4 16.1 0.6 100.0
4 8.9 2.5 3.1 14.0 48.7 22.8 100.0
5 14.7 5.4 15.2 4.1 6.3 54.4 100.0
90’s
Quintile
Type 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum
0 90.5 5.8 2.0 1.2 0.2 0.3 100.0
1 27.4 52.3 15.3 4.0 1.0 0.0 100.0
2 8.4 10.9 55.6 22.4 2.7 0.0 100.0
3 11.9 3.6 12.8 52.8 17.6 1.3 100.0
4 15.4 1.0 3.5 13.3 51.1 15.7 100.0
5 11.1 1.0 2.1 2.0 8.9 75.0 100.0
Notes: PSID, 25-60 years old, annual earnings.
20account to compute the other quintiles. But due to small sample size in the 70’s and the 80’s (as
stated earlier, conditionnal maximum likelihood is data intensive), the δ’s can not be identiﬁed,
and thus this check is performed only for the 90’s. The speciﬁc quintiles distributions at the
stationnary equilibrium are presented in Table 9 in the appendix. The results are qualitatively
the same: there is a clear segmentation of the population: each type of individual spends most
of the time in a speciﬁc quintile.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the structure of earnings mobility in the United States. The idea is to
decompose a quintiles transition matrix into a weighted sum of individual-speciﬁc matrices and
to describe the nature of these speciﬁc matrices. To achieve this decomposition, unobserved
heterogeneity is introduced in earnings quintiles transition matrices. I model quintiles dynamics
directly as a dynamic multinomial logit with unobserved heterogeneity, which allows me to
disentangle labor market ﬂexibility from time-constant individual characteristics. In a ﬁrst stage,
in order to compute estimates robust to any speciﬁcation of the unobserved heterogeneity, state
dependence parameters are estimated with a semi-parametric conditionnal maximum likelihood.
In a second stage the support of the unobserved heterogeneity is supposed to be discrete, the
initial conditions problem is taken into account and the likelihood is maximized via a standard
EM algorithm.
In the ﬁrst stage, the estimation of the state dependence parameters shows that, since it de-
creases downward mobility probabilities, labor market ﬂexibility seems to be a downward rigidity.
Then, the estimation of the entire model shows, by identifying 5 or 6 types of individual-speciﬁc
transition matrices, that unobserved heterogeneity plays a crucial role in earnings mobility. The
nature of these matrices is to “attract” each individual towards a zone of the quintiles distribu-
tion, and thus the eﬀect of this heterogeneity is to segment the population. Interestingly, while
the level of earnings mobility has remained quite stable since 1970, its structure has changed in
21the middle of the quintiles distribution: the speciﬁc zones in which individuals move were larger
in the 70’s than in the 80’s and the 90’s. This result shows that via the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity, earnings mobility segments the population and that this segmentation was more
pronounced in the 80’s and the 90’s than in the 70’s.
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23Table 6: Type-Speciﬁc Transition Matrices, 70’s
Origin Dest Q, Type 0 (38.6%) Dest Q, Type 1 (12.9%) Dest Q, Type 2-3 (19.3%)
Quintile 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum
0 90.2 4.3 2.4 1.5 1.2 0.4 100.0 38.0 50.1 9.1 0.9 0.0 1.9 100.0 35.2 16.4 30.1 13.7 3.3 1.2 100.0
1 65.0 15.3 11.9 7.9 0.0 0.0 100.0 10.7 69.9 17.4 1.9 0.0 0.0 100.0 8.3 19.3 48.4 24.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
2 48.1 10.3 18.8 14.7 8.2 0.0 100.0 9.2 54.8 31.9 4.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 4.2 8.8 51.7 30.2 5.1 0.0 100.0
3 42.8 6.2 13.1 22.1 11.7 4.1 100.0 10.5 42.3 28.8 8.0 0.0 10.3 100.0 3.7 5.2 35.9 45.3 7.4 2.6 100.0
4 38.2 0.0 10.0 20.5 21.1 10.3 100.0 14.6 0.0 34.1 11.5 0.0 39.8 100.0 3.6 0.0 29.7 45.5 14.4 6.9 100.0
5 44.9 0.0 0.0 10.8 23.2 21.2 100.0 16.3 0.0 0.0 5.7 0.0 77.9 100.0 7.2 0.0 0.0 41.1 27.2 24.4 100.0
Origin Destination Quintile Dest Q, Type 3-4 (13.8%) Dest Q, Type 5 (15.3%)
Quintile 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum
0 38.4 16.7 5.6 13.7 22.8 2.9 100.0 67.9 0.1 0.8 3.6 10.3 17.3 100.0
1 14.8 31.8 14.5 38.9 0.0 0.0 100.0 67.7 0.4 5.6 26.3 0.0 0.0 100.0
2 5.1 10.1 10.8 34.0 39.9 0.0 100.0 24.1 0.1 4.2 23.6 47.9 0.0 100.0
3 3.4 4.5 5.6 38.4 43.0 5.0 100.0 9.1 0.0 1.2 15.1 29.1 45.4 100.0
4 2.3 0.0 3.2 26.8 58.2 9.4 100.0 4.3 0.0 0.5 7.4 27.8 59.9 100.0
5 2.7 0.0 0.0 14.1 63.9 19.3 100.0 3.1 0.0 0.0 2.4 18.8 75.7 100.0
Notes: PSID, 25-60 years old, annual earnings.
2
4Table 7: Type-Speciﬁc Transition Matrices, 80’s
Origin Dest Q, Type 0 (26.1%) Dest Q, Type 1 (11.6%) Dest Q, Type 2 (8.4%)
Quintile 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum
0 91.1 5.8 1.6 0.7 0.6 0.2 100.0 43.1 46.9 8.0 1.5 0.5 0.0 100.0 10.5 34.0 47.9 6.3 1.1 0.2 100.0
1 72.8 20.6 4.8 1.8 0.0 0.0 100.0 15.1 72.9 10.3 1.7 0.0 0.0 100.0 2.9 42.0 49.5 5.6 0.0 0.0 100.0
2 74.2 11.4 8.1 3.6 2.7 0.0 100.0 19.9 52.0 22.3 4.4 1.5 0.0 100.0 2.5 19.0 67.9 9.1 1.5 0.0 100.0
3 72.7 7.4 6.1 6.7 5.3 1.8 100.0 24.0 41.6 20.8 10.0 3.6 0.0 100.0 2.8 14.3 59.3 19.4 3.3 0.8 100.0
4 69.2 0.0 4.9 4.6 14.5 6.8 100.0 40.6 0.0 29.5 12.3 17.5 0.0 100.0 3.5 0.0 62.6 17.8 12.1 4.0 100.0
5 63.5 0.0 0.0 4.7 16.6 15.1 100.0 53.5 0.0 0.0 17.8 28.6 0.1 100.0 7.3 0.0 0.0 40.8 31.5 20.4 100.0
Origin Dest Q, Type 3 (20.8%) Dest Q, Type 4 (18.1%) Dest Q, Type 5 (15.0%)
Quintile 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum
0 38.8 9.3 18.3 26.9 6.4 0.2 100.0 44.8 11.3 6.2 13.8 18.7 5.3 100.0 50.1 12.3 21.5 3.5 2.4 10.2 100.0
1 16.6 17.7 29.0 36.7 0.0 0.0 100.0 27.7 31.0 14.2 27.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 25.6 28.0 40.7 5.7 0.0 0.0 100.0
2 10.2 5.9 29.4 44.4 10.1 0.0 100.0 14.6 8.8 12.2 27.9 36.5 0.0 100.0 20.3 12.0 52.9 8.9 5.9 0.0 100.0
3 7.2 2.8 16.0 59.1 14.4 0.5 100.0 8.2 3.3 5.3 29.6 41.3 12.2 100.0 13.5 5.3 27.2 11.1 7.9 34.9 100.0
4 6.8 0.0 12.5 40.1 38.6 1.9 100.0 4.1 0.0 2.2 10.7 59.1 23.9 100.0 6.6 0.0 11.2 4.0 11.1 67.2 100.0
5 6.5 0.0 0.0 42.6 46.4 4.5 100.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 8.0 49.8 39.5 100.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 2.3 7.3 86.9 100.0
Notes: PSID, 25-60 years old, annual earnings.
2
5Table 8: Type-Speciﬁc Transition Matrices, 90’s
Origin Dest Q, Type 0 (19.6%) Dest Q, Type 1 (20.5%) Dest Q, Type 2 (15.1%)
Quintile 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum
0 92.3 4.8 1.5 0.9 0.2 0.3 100.0 50.6 36.8 8.9 2.6 1.0 0.0 100.0 30.2 15.7 39.1 13.1 1.9 0.0 100.0
1 73.8 18.9 5.3 1.9 0.0 0.0 100.0 18.2 65.1 14.2 2.5 0.0 0.0 100.0 9.6 24.6 54.9 11.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
2 69.2 13.5 10.4 6.1 0.8 0.0 100.0 16.9 45.9 27.5 7.9 1.9 0.0 100.0 5.2 10.2 62.5 20.3 1.8 0.0 100.0
3 75.0 5.8 6.1 8.6 1.9 2.6 100.0 26.3 28.5 23.2 15.9 6.1 0.0 100.0 7.2 5.6 46.2 35.9 5.2 0.0 100.0
4 81.5 0.0 4.8 6.0 3.4 4.3 100.0 41.3 0.0 26.5 16.0 16.2 0.0 100.0 9.9 0.0 46.3 31.7 12.1 0.0 100.0
5 89.7 0.0 0.0 4.1 1.5 4.7 100.0 71.7 0.0 0.0 17.2 11.1 0.0 100.0 28.8 0.0 0.0 57.2 13.9 0.1 100.0
Origin Dest Q, Type 3 (12.7%) Dest Q, Type 4 (18.7%) Dest Q, Type 5 (13.4%)
Quintile 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum
0 40.2 8.3 12.5 30.1 8.3 0.7 100.0 50.5 3.6 5.3 10.7 23.3 6.7 100.0 44.5 4.8 6.6 2.4 7.2 34.6 100.0
1 18.7 18.9 25.7 36.8 0.0 0.0 100.0 42.2 14.7 19.5 23.6 0.0 0.0 100.0 42.9 22.6 28.3 6.2 0.0 0.0 100.0
2 8.0 6.2 23.0 53.5 9.3 0.0 100.0 14.9 4.0 14.4 28.2 38.5 0.0 100.0 24.0 9.6 33.0 11.7 21.6 0.0 100.0
3 7.1 2.2 11.0 61.1 17.2 1.4 100.0 9.0 1.0 4.7 22.2 49.2 13.9 100.0 7.4 1.2 5.5 4.7 14.1 67.2 100.0
4 8.3 0.0 9.3 45.8 34.0 2.5 100.0 6.9 0.0 2.6 10.9 63.5 16.0 100.0 5.3 0.0 2.9 2.1 17.1 72.6 100.0
5 15.7 0.0 0.0 54.0 25.5 4.8 100.0 12.6 0.0 0.0 12.3 45.7 29.4 100.0 6.2 0.0 0.0 1.5 7.8 84.5 100.0
Notes: PSID, 25-60 years old, annual earnings.
2
6Table 9: Speciﬁc Quintile Stationnary Distributions
in the 90’s, Quintile Zero Only Composed of Zero
Earnings.
Quintile
Type 0 1 2 3 4 5 Sum
0 72.7 16.6 5.4 2.5 1.2 1.6 100.0
1 12.9 66.0 16.5 3.9 0.7 0.0 100.0
2 4.3 17.3 63.6 12.9 1.4 0.5 100.0
3 5.4 5.9 16.8 55.4 14.3 2.2 100.0
4 4.3 3.5 3.1 11.9 60.9 16.2 100.0
5 4.3 1.4 1.1 1.5 6.5 85.1 100.0
Notes: PSID, 25-60 years old, annual earnings.
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